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The important international agreement on diamonds reached this year will not be effective if it is 
not monitored, and if the countries and companies that traffic in conflict diamonds are not 
stopped. 
In March 2002, an international meeting in Ottawa, Canada concluded a remarkable agreement to 
end "conflict" or "blood" diamonds. Conflict diamonds have been used by rebels in Sierra Leone, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola to buy weapons and to fuel horrific wars that 
have so far, either directly or indirectly, taken more than two million lives. Conflict diamonds — a 
relatively small part of the overall diamond trade — have piggy-backed on the well-established 
and much larger traffic in illicit diamonds. Illicit diamonds, which represent as much as 20 percent 
of the trade, are stolen or smuggled, and are used mainly for money laundering tax evasion. 
Diamonds have a great deal of carbon, symbolism, and cash value compressed into them, but they 
are one of the least regulated commodities on earth. Seven and a half billion dollars worth of rough 
diamonds translate into nearly $60 billion worth of diamond jewelry in a year, and yet no one can 
say for sure where any diamond in a jewelry shop today was mined. Even Canadian diamonds with 
snow geese, maple leaves, and polar bears lasered onto them disappear for a time into the sorting 
houses of Antwerp before they return to Canada for cutting and polishing. 
What we do know is that 75 percent of the world’s gem diamonds are mined in Africa, and that 
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), in Angola, the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, and a wide range of rebels and gangsters in the Congo have 
killed, maimed, and rampaged over huge areas in order to get them. And until four years ago, there 
was no outrage, no concern, and no action. That changed with a report on Angola by Global 
Witness, a British nongovernmental organization (NGO), and by a report on Sierra Leone in 
January 2000 by Partnership Africa Canada (PAC).
 
 
International agreement on diamond handling 
, and media exposés, 37 governments and the 
diamond industry began meeting, along with NGOs, in an effort to create an international 
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ed in the diamond trade today fulfills the requirements of 
the proposed scheme. The aim, following the Ottawa meeting, is that participating countries will 
Spurred by NGO studies, a growing NGO coalition
certification system for rough diamonds. The "Kimberley Process" was named after the town in 
South Africa where the first meeting was held in May 2000, and the Ottawa meeting — the th
the series — resolved almost all the outstanding issues but one. Delegations agreed on standards 
for handling uncut diamonds at all stages of their progress, from mine to cutting factory. They 
agreed on an international database, on definitions, deterrents and coordination; they even agreed
on how to handle potential difficulties with the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The one thing governments rejected, however, was the one thing that NGOs had ins
issue, the debate was long and heated, but the final text essentially left monitoring missions to the 
discretion of the entire membership of the Kimberley Process at their annual plenary meetings, t
be triggered only by credible indications of significant non-compliance with the international 
certification scheme. 
A meaningless monit
The monitoring provision is so full of ca
international agreement of the past decade — from those dealing with chemical weapons and 
money laundering, to endangered species and landmines. While the assembled governm
agreeing on wording in the diamond agreement, in fact, there were already "credible indication
that a wide variety of countries would be in "significant non-compliance with the international 
certification scheme" if permitted to join. 
Take Dubai, for example. Dubai’s exports 
diamonds will be excluded from world trade, but all it has to do is inform the Chair that it is 
"willing and able to fulfill the requirements of the scheme" and it is in. Unless, of course, it is
decided by the full plenary that "indications" suggest "significant non-compliance." Only then
would a review mission be triggered, and only after Dubai had a) agreed to submit to such a 
review, and b) agreed on "the size, composition, terms of reference and time frame" of the miss
Or take any of half a dozen legitimate diamond producers — Guinea, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, 
by Belgian importers. Take South Africa, where illicit diamonds arrive every day for launder
through defunct South African mines. Take Canada or the US, where there are virtually no serious
controls on rough diamond imports. Take countries like Rwanda, Uganda, Gambia, Congo-
Brazzaville, Zambia, and others that collectively export hundreds of millions of dollars worth of 
anonymous rough diamonds every year, even though they do not mine a single carat themse
Will they be allowed to join — without a review — simply by notifying the Kimberley Process 
Chair that they are "willing and able" to fulfill the requirements of the scheme? 
The thriving trade in illicit diamonds 
The truth is that almost no country involv
review their regulatory frameworks in order to put the required systems in place for a launch of the 
worldwide system in November 2002. But there are many countries, many businesses, and many 
individuals that have thrived on the illicit trade in diamonds. There have always been laws against 
theft, smuggling, and murder, but they have been completely ineffective where these players are 
concerned. As a result, untold numbers of innocent people have died in wars that were fueled and 
protracted by diamonds; millions have been displaced; and entire countries destroyed. 
Without effective, regular, independent monitoring of all national control systems, the Kimberley 
provisions will be no more effective than what already exists. An important international 
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oordinator for Partnership Africa Canada (PAC). PAC’s work on 
diamonds has been supported by several NGOs and donor agencies, including Canada’s 
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agreement has been reached in record time. If it is effective, it may well end this disgraceful blight
on the diamond industry. But it will not be effective if it is not monitored, and if the count
companies that traffic in conflict diamonds are not stopped. The countries that mine and trade in 
diamonds have a responsibility to address this issue again, and to ensure that controls are credible 
and genuinely effective. 
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